Demonstration/Exercises

NPP/RR Entry Control Point:

Topic: Entry Control Point (ECP) – Contraband Detection and Access Authorizations

Location: STEC Entry Control Point trailer

<u>Overview:</u> A demonstration was held at the STEC Entry Control Point to illustrate challenges associated with access control for employees that use an Entry Control Point. For entry by an authorized person, the ECP guards must screen for unallowable contraband going into a facility that might be used by a malicious insider for theft or sabotage. For egress out of an ECP, radiation portal monitors as well as metal detectors must be used by guards to detect theft of nuclear materials or other contraband.

Good Practices for Discussion:

- I. Access Control:
 - A. Contraband detection:
 - 1. Determining the list of contraband for access to different locations.
 - a. Does the list change with non-employees such as inspectors or contractors?
 - b. What compensatory measures are used when items on the contraband list are required for maintenance?
 - 2. Reporting of contraband violations.
 - a. What are the reporting requirements?
 - i. What facility organization receives the reports?
 - ii. Are there penalties for continued violations?
 - b. Are the requirements different for non-employees?
 - 3. Nuclear Security Culture.
 - a. Was a good NSC displayed by the security guards with an item not on the official list which was still suspicious was discovered?
 - b. What would have been an appropriate response by the security guards?
 - c. Were the guards receive specific ITM mitigation?
 - 4. Detection equipment
 - a. What equipment is appropriate at an ECP?
 - b. What facility organization should use the secondary search equipment like the handheld radiation detector?
 - c. How often should the equipment be calibrated and performance tested?
 - d. What testing occurs after routine or emergency maintenance?
 - 5. Emerging Technologies
 - a. What new technologies could be used to circumvent contraband searches?
 - b. Is moving the location of the contraband search closer to the target a good solution? What are others?
 - 6. Ingress vs. Egress
 - a. Should the same level of searches be conducted for ingress and egress?
 - b. Is there safety equipment like radiation portal monitors that are normally used only for contamination control that could be used for security as well if properly monitored and implemented?
 - B. Escorting requirements:
 - 1. Is training required to be an escort?
 - 2. Are the qualifications different for escorts based on areas or activities?

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- 3. Are the records of escorted access examined to see how often people are escorted into an area?
- C. Granting and removing authorizations for access.
 - 1. Are two separate organizations involved in the request/authorization for access?
 - 2. Is access authorization immediately removed when no longer required?
- D. Emergency Situations
 - 1. Medical emergencies
 - a. What agreements are in place with outside organizations to allow immediate response to a medical emergency?
 - i. How are those agreements exercised or tested
 - b. What searches are possible for a victim vs. a responder upon egress?
 - c. What equipment is needed for the searches?
 - 2. Fire/Radiation alarms
 - a. What agreements are in place with outside organizations to allow immediate response to a fire or radiological emergency?
 - i. How are those agreements exercised or tested?
 - ii. What equipment is needed for the searches?
 - b. What procedures are in place to allow personnel to evacuate immediately but still be searched before leaving the facility or returning to the buildings involved?
 - i. How are those procedures exercised or tested?
 - ii. What equipment is needed for the searches?
 - c. What procedures are in place for examining buildings or areas to determine that no nuclear material, radioactive material, or classified information is missing or no acts of sabotage have occurred?
 - i. How are those procedures exercised or tested?
 - ii. What equipment is needed for the searches?
 - iii. What organizations would be involved in the examinations and searches?
 - 3. Natural disasters
 - a. What procedures are in place to allow personnel to evacuate immediately but still be searched before leaving the facility or returning to the buildings involved?
 - i. How are those procedures exercised or tested?
 - ii. What equipment is needed for the searches?
 - b. What procedures are in place for examining building or area to determine that no nuclear material, radioactive material, classified information is missing or no acts of sabotage have occurred?
 - i. How are those procedures exercised or tested?
 - ii. What equipment is needed for the searches?
 - iii. What organizations would be involved in the examinations and searches?
 - 4. Differences between measures for different types of emergencies
 - a. What are the major differences between the required measures for different types of emergencies?
 - 5. What emerging technologies might be used by a malicious insider to bring contraband into a secure facility?